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Robust Secure Transmission of Using
Main-Lobe-Integration Based Leakage Beaforming
in Directional Modulation MU-MIMO Systems
Feng Shu, Wei Zhu, Xiangwei Zhou, Jun Li, and Jinhui Lu .
Abstract—In the paper, we make an investigation of robust
beamforming for secure directional modulation in the multi-user
multiple-input and multiple output (MU-MIMO) systems in the
presence of direction angle measurement errors. When statistical
knowledge of direction angle measurement errors is unavailable,
a novel robust beamforming scheme of combining main-lobe-
integration (MLI) and leakage is proposed to simultaneously
transmit multiple different independent parallel confidential mes-
sage streams to the associated multiple distinct desired users. The
proposed scheme includes two steps: designing the beamforming
vectors of the useful confidential messages and constructing
artificial noise (AN) projection matrix. Here, in its first step,
the beamforming vectors for the useful confidential messages of
desired user k are given by minimizing the useful signal power
leakage from main-lobe of desired user k to the sum of main-lobes
of the remaining desired directions plus main-lobes of all eaves-
dropper directions. In its second step, the AN projection matrix is
constructed by simultaneously maximizing the AN power leakage
to all eavesdropper directions such that all eavesdroppers are
disrupted seriously, where AN is viewed by the transmitter as a
useful signal for eavedroppers. Due to independent beamforming
vectors for different desired users, a more secure transmission
is achieved. Compared with conventional non-robust methods,
the proposed method can provide a significant improvement in
bit error rate along the desired directions and secrecy-sum-
rate towards multiple desired users without needing statistical
property or distribution of angle measurement errors.
Index Terms—Robust, directional modulation, leakage, main-
lobe-integration, multi-user MIMO, secrecy-sum-rate, artificial
noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
The privacy and security of information transmission are
extremely important for wireless communications and net-
working [1]–[6]. Due to the broadcasting nature and lack of
physical boundaries of wireless transmission, the information
is readily intercepted by unauthorized users, and the growing
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cyber criminal events in mobile terminals have exposed the
enormous hidden risks in wireless communications and net-
working. Traditional encryption techniques can only provide
computational security and rely heavily on the complexity of
their keys, that are very easy to be cracked if an efficient
method to solve the corresponding mathematical problem is
found [1]–[4]. In the emerging social aware network, in order
to take full advantage of wireless network resources, several
incentive mechanisms based on credit or friendship had been
presented to stimulate selfish users to forward data for other
terminals, which will result in more serious security problems
if the useful messages are intercepted by malicious users [5],
[6]. In 1975, Wyner first proposes the remarkable wiretap
channel model and lays the foundations of information theory
of physical-layer security communications in [7]–[9]. In recent
years, the physical-layer security has ever been becoming
a promising research field in wireless communications and
networking by exploiting the physical-layer characteristics of
wireless channels [10]–[15].
As a novel physical-layer security technology in wireless
communications and networking, directional modulation (DM)
has been attracting widespread attention and research activities
from both academia and industry. In [16], the authors introduce
a technique of near-field direct antenna modulation (NFDAM),
changing the antenna boundary conditions at the symbol rate
thereby modulating the phase and amplitude of the antenna
pattern. A simplified structure of DM synthesis relying on
actively excited elements in phased arrays is described in [17],
[18]. Subsequently, the artificial-noise-aided security emerges
and is applied to confidential transmission [19]–[21], which
enables the transmitter to transmit artificial noise (AN), as an
interference signal, and confidential messages together, such
that the AN is only used to interfere with the eavesdroppers
without affecting the legitimate receivers. The algorithm in
[11] allocates that all the remaining available transmit power to
transmit AN in the case that the desired receivers are guaran-
teed to achieve a target signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio
(SINR). Based on the previous work, the authors in [22], [23]
initiate the DM research on the baseband signal processing
and propose to add the orthogonal vector, which can be chosen
and updated in the null space of channel vector at the desired
direction, to the transmitted baseband signal as AN [22], [23].
An orthogonal-vector-approach-based synthesis of multi-beam
DM follows immediately from [24]. The methods in [22] and
[23] are shown to perform very well for the perfect direction
angles but be quite sensitive to the measurement errors of
2direction angles. To reduce the impact of the measurement
errors, the authors in [25] propose a robust DM synthesis
method that is capable of achieving an excellent performance
of bit error rate under imperfect direction angle in a single-
desired-user scenario. In [25], a closed-form projection matrix
is derived to force the AN to the null space of steering vector
of the desired direction by utilizing the uniform distribution
of measurement angle errors. In [26], the authors propose a
robust beamforming scheme for multi-beam DM broadcasting
systems and derive the expressions of different beamformers
for various scenarios, in which case only one confidential
message stream is broadcasted to multiple desired users.
However, most existing work focuses on robust and non-
robust synthesis schemes of DM. Such schemes require perfect
knowledge of direction angles or imperfect one with distri-
bution of angle measurement errors at the transmitters. In a
practical DM system, it is impossible to obtain perfect knowl-
edge of direction angles or precisely model the distribution
of angle measurement errors. This motivates us to develop a
low-complexity and robust synthesis scheme needing only the
estimated direction angles, without requiring perfect direction
angles or the distribution of angle measurement errors under
the imperfect case.
In this paper, we consider multiple confidential message
stream transmission of using directional modulation in MU-
MIMO scenario. We propose a main-lobe-integration (MLI)
based leakage synthesis scheme. This method is based on
leakage idea in [27]–[30] and MLI, and shown robust to angle
measurement errors in our simulation. Our main contributions
are as follows:
• We propose a totally distinct robust beamfroming method
of using the concept of leakage in multi-user MIMO (MU-
MIMO) situation, which does not require the statistical knowl-
edge of direction angle measurement error, i.e., to estimate
the variances of direction error. However, in [25], [26], the
proposed robust methods need to predict the variances of
direction estimation errors or even know the distributions of
measurement errors in advance.
• The robust method proposed by us simultaneously sends
multiple distinct independent parallel confidential message
streams to the associated multi-desired-receivers. However,
those methods in [25] and [26] transmit only single confi-
dential message stream towards one or more desired users.
• The beamforming vectors for different desired users are
individually designed and distinct in this paper. This guaran-
tees that any desired receiver can not intercept confidential
messages of others desired user, which further improves the
transmit security. However, in [26], all desired-user channels
are combined into one total large virtual channel and only
single identical desired beamforming vector is required and
devised for all desired users due to broadcasting scenario.
• In the following, AN is viewed as a virtual useful signal
for eavesdroppers and we construct the AN projecting matrix
by minimizing the leakage of AN power to the main-lobes
of the desired directions. This will reduce the effect of AN
on desired receivers and maximize the effect of AN on
eavesdroppers. In [26], the AN projection matrix is designed
by using the criterion of maximizing receiving-AN-to-signal-
noise ratio at undesired receivers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. System model
is described in Section II. Section III presents the proposed
robust synthesis method with desired angle uncertainty under
two cases: imperfect and unknown eavesdropper directions.
The numerical results are shown and discussed in section IV,
and Section V concludes this paper.
Notations: throughout the paper, matrices, vectors, and
scalars are denoted by letters of bold upper case, bold lower
case, and lower case, respectively. Signs (·)T , (·)H , (·)−1
and tr(·) denote matrix transpose, conjugate transpose, Moore-
Penrose inverse and trace, respectively. Operation (x)+ returns
zero if x is negative, otherwise x is returned. The notation E{·}
refers to the expectation operation. The symbol IN denotes the
N ×N identity matrix.
Since there are a lot of variables in this paper, we have
summarized main variables in Table I.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF MAIN VARIABLES
N Number of antennas at the base station(BS)
K Number of desired users
M Number of eavesdroppers
θdk The kth desired direction angle
θem The mth eavesdropping direction angle
s Transmit signal vector at the BS
dk The kth confidential message
vk Beamforming vector of the kth confidential message
TAN Projection matrix of AN
z Random AN vector
Ps Total transmit power constraint at the BS
α1 Normalized power factors for confidential messages
α2 Normalized power factors for AN
β1 Power allocation of confidential messages
β2 Power allocation of AN
h(θ) Normalized steering vector along the direction θ
ϕθ(n) Phase difference between the nth element in h(θ) and the
array phase center
y(θ) Received signal along the direction θ
ω Additive white Gaussian noise(AWGN) with distribution
CN (0, σ2ω)
Ck(θ) Achievable rate of receiving the kth useful data along the
direction θ
Csec Secrecy sum-rate
θˆdk The kth estimated desired direction angle
θˆem The mth estimated eavesdropping direction angle
θBW Beam width between first nulls (BWFN) for a long broadside
array
S Integral interval with single continuous interval or the union
of several subintervals
RS Integral result of the matrix h(θ)h(θ)
H within the interval S,
i.e., RS =
∫
S
h(θ)hH (θ) dθ
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A schematic diagram of directional modulation MU-MIMO
system is shown in Fig. 1, where N is the number of elements
at the base station (BS). In such a system, we assume that
K independent confidential messages {dk}Kk=1 are transmit-
ted towards K distinct desired users with direction angles
{θd1, θd2 , . . . , θdK}. Additionally, there are M eavesdroppers
with direction angles {θe1 , θe2 , . . . , θeM }. Due to the irregular
reflection and refraction in the multipath fading channel, the
3Eavesdropper M
Eavesdropper 1 Desired user 1
Desired user K
Ă
Ă
Element 1 Element 2 Element N
 Antenna array at base station
Fig. 1. Directional modulation MU-MIMO system, where different gray-scale
reds denote different confidential message streams for different desired users.
propagation direction of the signal is unpredictable, while
the directional modulation is very sensitive to the arrival
direction at desired receiver in the wireless channel. Until
now, the extension of directional modulation to multi-path
fading channel is a challenging problem. For example, if the
blocking object locates at the eavesdropper direction, then it
can reflect the AN to the desired receiver. We call the result
as the effect of gathering AN. This effect will dramatically
degrade the performance of the desired receiver by collecting
a large amount of AN from reflecting objects at the undesired
directions. Therefore, in this paper, we only consider the line-
of-propagation channels.
The confidential message dk with E
{
dHk dk
}
= 1 is sent
to the desired receiver k, and multiplied by an N × 1
beam-forming vector vk before being transmitted through the
channel, where vk is called the confidential useful vector for
desired user k below. Thus, the transmit signal vector is written
as
s = α1β1
√
Ps
K∑
k=1
vkdk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Confidential messages
+α2β2
√
PsTANz︸ ︷︷ ︸
AN
, (1)
where Ps is the total transmit power constraint at BS, β1 and
β2 are the power allocation between confidential messages and
AN such that
β21 + β
2
2 = 1, (2)
α1 and α2 are the normalized power factors for confidential
messages and AN such that
α22E
{
tr
[
TANzz
H
T
H
AN
]}
= 1, (3)
and TAN is the projection matrix of forcing AN to the
eavesdropping directions. The transmit signal vector in (1)
satisfies the following power constraint
α21E
{
K∑
k=1
K∑
k′=1
v
H
k′vkdkd
H
k′
}
= 1. (4)
If E
{
dkd
H
k
}
= 1, vHk vk = 1, and E
{
zz
H
}
= 1N−K IN−K ,
(3) and (4) can be further simplified as
α22tr
[
TANT
H
AN
]
= N −K, (5)
and
α21 =
1
K
. (6)
The N × 1 vector s passes through the LoS channel, the
received signal along direction θ is given by
y(θ) = hH(θ)s + ω, (7)
where ω is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
distribution CN (0, σ2ω), and
h(θ) =
1√
N

ej2piϕθ(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
h1(θ)
, · · · , ej2piϕθ(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hn(θ)
, · · · , ej2piϕθ(N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hN (θ)

T
(8)
is the normalized steering vector along the direction θ with
function ϕθ(n) defined by
ϕθ(n) ,
(n−(N+1)/2)d cos θ
λ , (n = 1, 2, . . . , N), (9)
where d denotes the spacing between two adjacent elements
of transmit antenna array and λ is the wavelength of transmit
carrier. According to (7), the received signal at the kth desired
user is given by
y(θdk) = h
H(θdk)s+ ωdk
= α1β1
√
Psh
H(θdk)vkdk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Useful data
+α1β1
√
Psh
H(θdk)
K∑
i=1,i6=k
vidi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interference from other users
+ α2β2
√
Psh
H(θdk)TANz︸ ︷︷ ︸
AN
+ ωdk︸︷︷︸
AWGN
, (10)
where the first term of the above expression is the useful
received signal for user k, the second one is the multi-user
interference from other users, the third one is the AN, and the
last one is the AWGN with distribution CN (0, σ2dk) at receiver.
Similarly, the received signal at eavesdropper m is
y(θem) = h
H(θem)s + ωem
= α1β1
√
Psh
H(θem)
K∑
k=1
vkdk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Confidential messages
+ α2β2
√
Psh
H(θem)TANz︸ ︷︷ ︸
AN
+ ωem︸︷︷︸
AWGN
, (11)
where the first term of the above expression is composed of
the confidential messages intercepted by eavesdropper m, the
second one is the AN to disturb eavesdropper m, and the last
one is the AWGN with distribution CN (0, σ2em).
To evaluate the security performance for multi-user scenario
in this paper, the secrecy sum-rate is adopted and can be de-
fined as the sum of difference in available rate receiving useful
4Ck(θdk) , I(y(θdk); [dk, θdk ])
= log2(1 +
α21β
2
1Psh
H(θdk)vkv
H
k h(θdk)
σ2dk +
K∑
i=1,i6=k
α21β
2
1Psh
H(θdk)viv
H
i h(θdk) + α
2
2β
2
2Psh
H(θdk)TANT
H
ANh(θdk)
). (13)
Ck(θem) , I(y(θem); [dk, θem ])
= log2(1 +
α21β
2
1Psh
H(θem)vkv
H
k h(θem)
σ2em +
K∑
i=1,i6=k
α21β
2
1Psh
H(θem)viv
H
i h(θem) + α
2
2β
2
2Psh
H(θem)TANT
H
ANh(θem)
). (14)
data between secure transmission channel and eavesdropper
channel, [31], [32],
Csec =
K∑
k=1
[
Ck(θdk)−maxm Ck(θem)
]+
, (12)
where Ck(θdk) and Ck(θem) shown in (13) and (14) are
the achievable rates of receiving useful data dk along the
kth desired direction θdk and the mth eavesdropper direction
θem , respectively. Function I(y; [d, θ]) denotes the mutual
information along direction θ between the input d and the
output y.
The secrecy sum-rate in (12) is one of the most important
metrics for assessing the performance of the DM system.
Under the multi-user scenario, the expression of the secrecy
sum-rate in (12) contains multiple variables, i.e., Rk(θdk) and
Rk(θem). In addition, Rk(θdk) and Rk(θem) are both K + 1
coupled variables with {vdk}Kk=1 and TAN as shown in (13)
and (14), respectively. Apparently, it is challenging to solve
the K + 1 coupled optimization problems. Maximizing the
secrecy sum-rate in (12) directly is an NP-hard problem with
exponential complexity. Maybe, with a high-computational
amount, only suboptimal solution is achieved. On the other
hand, minimizing the bit error rate (BER), which is another
important metric for evaluating the DM system, of a selected
user will depend heavily on other users’ beamforming vec-
tors and direction angles. The coupled property requires the
iteration operation. Additionally, it is not easy to guarantee
its convergence. To address the above, we propose a main-
lobe-integration based leakage beamforming method, which
can provide an approximate closed-form solution with low-
complexity and high performance. More importantly, due
to main-lobe-integration, it is also robust to direction angle
measurement errors.
III. PROPOSED ROBUST SYNTHESIS METHOD WITH
DESIRED ANGLE UNCERTAINTY
In Fig. 2, we sketch the basic idea of the proposed robust
precoding method based on MLI and leakage. As shown In
Fig. 2, if desired user k is chosen as the current desired user,
the corresponding confidential useful beamforming vector is
given by minimizing its useful signal power leakage to the
remaining desired users and all eavesdroppers. Confidential
beamforming vector corresponding to each desired user is
designed individually in order to safeguard each desired user
privacy. The AN projection matrix TAN is optimized by
maximizing the AN power leakage to all eavesdroppers. In
other words, the influence of AN on all desired users is
minimized. Here, TAN is constructed in the all-in-one way not
individually. In the following, we mainly consider the imper-
fect desired direction, where imperfect means that there exists
with measurement errors on the measured desired direction
angles. Eavesdropper direction angles fall into two categories:
imperfect (See Subsection III.A) and unknown (See Subsec-
tion III.B). In the first scenario, both desired and eavesdropper
directions are imperfect. In other words, there usually exists
errors in the measured desired and eavesdropper directions.
In the second scenario, eavesdropper directions are unknown
while the measured desired directions are imperfect. In the
two situations, we accordingly show how to design the AN
projection matrix TAN and confidential useful beamforming
vectors vdk .
Ă
Selected 
desired users
k
d
ĂĂ
Eavesdroppers
BS
AN
k
d
k
d
Ă
Unselected 
desired users
1e Me
ĂĂ ĂĂ
1d 1kd - 1kd + Kd
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the proposed scheme.
A. Imperfect desired and eavesdropper directions
In practice, the desired and eavesdropper directions are
unknown. In this case, the BS can estimate both the values of
desired and eavesdropper direction angles with traditional spa-
tial spectrum estimation such as MUSIC, Capon and ESPRIT
[33]. Due to the effect of channel noise, there always exist
errors in the estimated direction angles. Given the estimated
direction angles θˆdk and θˆem associated with desired user k
and eavesdropper m, we define their main-lobe intervals as
Sdk =
[
θˆdk −
θBW
2
, θˆdk +
θBW
2
]
, (15)
5and
Sem =
[
θˆem −
θBW
2
, θˆem +
θBW
2
]
, (16)
where
θBW =
2λ
Nd
(17)
is the beam width between first nulls (BWFN) for a long
broadside array [34]. Therefore, the overall direction angle
intervals of all main-lobes of desired users and eavesdroppers
are
Sd =
K⋃
k=1
[
θˆdk −
θBW
2
, θˆdk +
θBW
2
]
, S¯d = [0, pi] \Sd,
(18)
and
Se =
M⋃
m=1
[
θˆem −
θBW
2
, θˆem +
θBW
2
]
, (19)
respectively. Based on the above discussion, the average power
of confidential message stream dk sent to desired user k is
Pdk,U = E
{∫
Sdk
α21β
2
1Psd
H
k v
H
dkh(θ)h
H(θ)vdkdk dθ
}
=
∫
Sdk
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dk
h(θ)hH(θ)vdk dθ. (20)
The remaining power leakage of confidential message stream
dk to other desired users and all eavesdroppers is represented
as
Pdk,L
=
K∑
i=1,i6=k
E
{∫
Sdi
α21β
2
1Psd
H
k v
H
dk
h(θ)hH(θ)vdkdk dθ
}
+
M∑
m=1
E
{∫
Sem
α21β
2
1Psd
H
k v
H
dkh(θ)h
H(θ)vdkdk dθ
}
,
(21)
which can be simplified as
Pdk,L =
K∑
i=1,i6=k
∫
Sdi
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dkh(θ)h
H(θ)vdk dθ
+
M∑
m=1
∫
Sem
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dkh(θ)h
H(θ)vdk dθ, (22)
where the first and second terms are the leakage powers to
other desired users and all eavesdroppers, respectively. We
define the corresponding MLI-SLNR as follows
MLI-SLNR(vdk) =
Pdk,U∫
Sdk
σ2dk dθ + Pdk,L
. (23)
which, according to Appendix A, can be simplified as
MLI-SLNR(vdk) =
v
H
dk
RSdk
vdk
vHdk
(
σ2
dk
θBW
α21β
2
1Ps
IN +RSd\Sdk +RSe
)
vdk
, (24)
where matrix RS is defined as
RS =
∫
S
h(θ)hH(θ) dθ, (25)
where S is the integral interval with single continuous interval
or the union of several subintervals and each element of RS
is the definite integration of the corresponding element in the
N × N matrix h(θ)hH(θ) , which is a function of θ, over
the interval S. The detailed derivation of matrix RS is given
in Appendix B. Maximizing the MLI-SLNR in (24) by using
the generalized Rayleigh-Ritz theorem in [35] yields that the
optimal vdk is the normalized eigenvector corresponding to
the largest eigenvalue of[
σ2dkθBW
α21β
2
1Ps
IN +RSd\Sdk +RSe
]−1
RSdk
. (26)
Until now we complete the design of vdk . Below, we
similarly construct the projection matrix TAN of AN. The
basic idea is to project less power of AN onto the subspace
spanned by all desired steering vectors and more onto its null
space. Here, we view the AN as a useful signal. The average
AN power sent to all main-lobes of all eavesdropper directions
is as follows
PAN,U
= E
{∫
Se
α22β
2
2Pstr
[
h
H(θ)TANzz
H
T
H
ANh(θ)
]
dθ
}
=
∫
Se
α22β
2
2Pstr
[
h
H(θ)TANE
{
zz
H
}
T
H
ANh(θ)
]
dθ, (27)
Given E
{
zz
H
}
= 1N−K IN−K and tr (AB) = tr (BA), the
above equation is reduced to
PAN,U =
α22β
2
2Ps
N −K tr
[
T
H
ANRSeTAN
]
. (28)
The average leakage power of AN to main-lobes of all desired
directions is given by
PAN,L
= E
{∫
Sd
α22β
2
2Pstr
[
z
H
T
H
ANh(θ)h
H(θ)TANz
]
dθ
}
.
(29)
Similar to (28), we have
PAN,L =
α22β
2
2Ps
N −K tr
[
T
H
ANRSdTAN
]
. (30)
Combining the above two expressions and using the definition
of SLNR, we have the MLI-SLNR of AN as
MLI-SLNR(TAN ) =
PAN,U∫
Se
σ2e dθ + PAN,L
=
tr
[
T
H
ANRSeTAN
]
(N−K)MθBWσ2e
α22β
2
2Ps
+ tr
[
THANRSdTAN
] ,
(31)
where
σ2e =
1
M
M∑
m=1
σ2em . (32)
6As a result, the optimal TAN when maximizing the MLI-
SLNR in (31) is composed of the N −K normalized eigen-
vectors corresponding to the N − K largest eigenvalues of
matrix [
(N −K)MθBWσ2e
α22β
2
2Ps
IN +RSd
]−1
RSe . (33)
B. Unknown eavesdropper directions
In the following, we consider a more practical scenario,
where the BS doesn’t know the exact or estimated direction
values of eavesdroppers. In such a situation, all the remaining
angle region excluding the union of main-lobes of all desired
directions, which is actually the complementary set S¯d of
Sd , will be viewed as the potential eavesdropper directions.
For desired user k, the main-lobe profile of all eavesdropper
and the remaining desired directions are virtually viewed
as a potential set of intercepting directions, defined as the
complementary set S¯dk of its main-lobe region Sdk , i.e.,
S¯dk = [0, pi] \Sdk
=
[
0, θˆdk −
θBW
2
]⋃[
θˆdk +
θBW
2
, pi
]
. (34)
Note that the useful part P ′dk,U of transmit signal power of
desired user k has the same expression as Pdk,U in (20). The
power leakage of confidential message stream dk transmitted
by BS to the set S¯dk of all potential eavesdropper directions
is represented as
P ′dk,L = E
{∫
S¯dk
α21β
2
1Psd
H
k v
H
dk
h(θ)hH(θ)vdkdk dθ
}
=
∫
S¯dk
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dkh(θ)h
H(θ)vdk dθ. (35)
Similar to (23), we can readily obtain the MLI-SLNR expres-
sion corresponding to the kth desired user as follows
MLI-SLNR′(vdk) =
P ′dk,U∫
Sdk
σ2dk dθ + P
′
dk,L
=
v
H
dk
RSdk
vdk
vHdk
(
σ2dk
θBW
α21β
2
1Ps
IN +RS¯dk
)
vdk
. (36)
The optimal vdk to maximize the MLI-SLNR in (36) is the
generalized eigenvector corresponding to the largest normal-
ized eigenvalue of[
σ2dkθBW
α21β
2
1Ps
IN +RS¯dk
]−1
RSdk
. (37)
For the design of TAN with unknown directions of eaves-
droppers, the angle range of all potential eavesdropping direc-
tions is S¯d, the average transmit AN power in S¯d is
P ′AN,U
= E
{∫
S¯d
α22β
2
2Pstr
[
h
H(θ)TANzz
H
T
H
ANh(θ)
]
dθ
}
=
α22β
2
2Ps
N −K tr
[
T
H
ANRS¯dTAN
]
, (38)
and the average leakage AN power P ′AN,L to main-lobes of all
desired directions is the same as (30). Based on the definition
of SLNR, we have the MLI-SLNR expression of AN as
MLI-SLNR′(TAN )
=
P ′AN,U∫
S¯d
σ2e dθ + P
′
AN,L
=
tr
[
T
H
ANRS¯dTAN
]
(N−K)( pi−KθBW )σ2e
α22β
2
2Ps
+ tr
[
THANRSdTAN
] . (39)
Similar to (33), via maximizing the MLI-SLNR in (39),
the optimal TAN is composed of the N − K normalized
eigenvectors corresponding to the N −K largest eigenvalues
of matrix[
(N −K)( pi −KθBW )σ2e
α22β
2
2Ps
IN +RSd
]−1
RS¯d . (40)
IV. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
To evaluate the bit error rate (BER) and secrecy-sum-rate
(SSR) performance of the proposed robust method, quadrature
phase shift keying (QPSK) is chosen, and main simulation
parameters are listed in Table II.
TABLE II
MAIN SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND THEIR VALUES
Parameter Value
d λ/2
N 16
K 2
{θdk}Kk=1 {60◦, 120◦}
M 3
{θem}Mm=1 {30◦, 90◦, 150◦}
Ps 1
β1
√
0.9
β2
√
0.1
∆θmax 5◦
Here, signal-to-noise ratio is defined as SNR =
10 log10(α
2
1β
2
1Ps/σ
2
ω), where σ
2
dk
= σ2em = σ
2
ω, ∀k ∈
{1, 2}, ∀m ∈ {1, 2, 3}. All measurement errors of desired and
eavesdropper direction angles are assumed to be independently
uniform distributed over the interval [−∆θmax,∆θmax]. The or-
thogonal projection (OP) method in [24] and the conventional
leakage-based method in [28] are adopted as performance ref-
erences, respectively. All the remaining angle region excluding
the union of main-lobes of all desired directions will be viewed
as the potential eavesdropper directions when eavesdroppers’
information are unable to be available.
Given the estimated desired and eavesdropper directions,
Fig. 3 (a) and (b) illustrate the curves of BER versus direction
angle of the proposed robust method in Section III-A, the OP
method in [24] and the conventional leakage-based method in
[28] for the first and second desired receivers, respectively. In
the Fig. 3 (a), it can be observed that our proposed method at
the desired direction 60◦ shows about an order-of-magnitude
improvement over that of the OP method and the conventional
leakage-based method. The lowest BER values of the OP
method and the conventional leakage-based method are ap-
proximately at the same level. As the receiver direction angle
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Fig. 3. BER versus direction angle with imperfect desired and eavesdropper
directions (SNR=14dB).
steers away from the desired direction, the BER performance
of both methods degrade rapidly. Compared to the remaining
two methods, the BER curve of our proposed method fluctu-
ates less outside the main-lobe of the desired direction. For the
second desired user with direction θd2 = 120
◦ in Fig. 3 (b),
the performance trend is similar to the first desired user.
Given the estimated desired directions and under unknown
eavesdropper directions, Fig. 4 (a) and (b) plot the curves of
BER versus direction angle of the proposed robust method in
Section III-B, the OP method in [24] and the conventional
leakage-based method in [28], respectively, for the first and
second desired receivers. From Fig. 4 (a), similar to Fig. 3 (a),
we can see that the proposed method still outperforms the
OP by approximately an order-of-magnitude in the desired
direction 60◦, where the BER value of the proposed method
is about one-third of the conventional leakage-based method.
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Fig. 4. BER versus direction angle with unknown eavesdropper directions
(SNR=14dB).
More importantly, the BER of the proposed method is about
40 percent in the remaining region outside the main-lobe of
the desired direction, and the curve fluctuates less than that of
the other two methods. This provides an effective barrier to
prevent potential eavesdroppers recovering confidential infor-
mation. Fig. 4 (b) presents a similar BER performance trend
for the second desired direction 120◦ as Fig. 4 (a).
In the following, we will evaluate the performance of the
proposed method from the SSR aspect. Fig. 5 demonstrates
the curves of SSR versus SNR for the proposed method with
imperfect desired and eavesdropper directions in Section III-
A, the OP method in [24] and the conventional leakage-based
method in [28]. As can be seen from Fig. 5, with the increase
in SNR, the SSRs of all three methods increase continuously
and monotonously. The SSR of the proposed method is always
larger than that of the remaining two methods. Their SSR
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Fig. 5. Secrecy sum rate versus SNR with imperfect desired and eavesdropper
directions.
values are up to 16.4 bit/s/Hz, 12.2 bit/s/Hz and 11.1 bit/s/Hz
at SNR = 35dB, respectively. Hence, the SSR improvement of
the proposed method over the OP method and the conventional
leakage-based method is significant. Additionally, the SSRs of
the three methods approach the same value as SNR goes to 0
dB. The rate gap between the proposed method and the other
two methods grows gradually with the increase in SNR.
In the scenario of unknown eavesdropper directions, Fig. 6
demonstrates the curves of SSR versus SNR for the proposed
method in Section III-B, the OP method in [24] and the
conventional leakage-based method in [28]. As indicated in
Fig. 6, the proposed method performs better than the OP
method and the conventional leakage-based method in terms
of SSR, in particular, in the medium and high SNR regions.
Their SSR values are up to 14.0 bit/s/Hz, 12.2 bit/s/Hz and
12.8 bit/s/Hz at SNR = 35 dB, respectively, in which case that
the proposed method shows an approximate 15 and 9 percent
SSR improvement over the OP and the conventional leakage-
based method, respectively. Additionally, the SSRs of all three
methods tend to be the same in the low SNR region. The rate
gap between the proposed method and the other two methods,
similar to Fig. 5, grows gradually with the increase in SNR.
Note that the SSRs of the proposed method in Fig. 6 are less
than the corresponding SSRs of the proposed method in Fig. 5
in the middle and high regions. This implies that the measured
values of eavesdropper direction angles play an important role
in improving the SSR performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study robust precoding in MU-MIMO
directional modulation systems under imperfect desired direc-
tions and eavesdropper directions or unknown eavesdropper di-
rections. To realize the high-performance robust secure multi-
message-stream simultaneous transmission in MU-MIMO sys-
tems, we propose an MLI-based precoding method. In the first
stage, the precoding vector per desired user is optimized to
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Fig. 6. Secrecy sum rate versus SNR with unknown eavesdropper directions.
maximize the transmit power of useful confidential messages
along the main-lobe of the corresponding desired direction and
correspondingly minimize the transmit power of AN along all
eavesdropper directions. In the second stage, the AN projection
matrix is designed to force AN to all eavesdropper directions
with only a small amount of residual AN along the main-
lobes of the desired directions. Due to the use of MLI, the
proposed method requires no perfect direction knowledge or
the distribution of measurement errors of direction angle, and
at the same time provides a robust performance. Simulation
results verify the performance benefits of our method. Com-
pared with OP, the proposed method can achieve an one-
order-magnitude improvement on BER and at the same time
its secrecy-sum-rate along the desired directions is shown to
have a substantial enhancement over that of OP in the high
SNR region. The proposed scheme can be applied to the future
satellite communications, mobile communications, D2D, V2V,
unmanned-aerial-vehicles networks, and internet of things.
APPENDIX A
SIMPLIFICATION OF MLI-SLNR(vdk)
Proof: The simplification of MLI-SLNR(vdk) is shown
in (41), where
a
= is achieved by extracting integral term
h(θ)hH(θ),
b
= is achieved by replacing
∫
Sdk
h(θ)hH(θ) dθ,∫
Sdi
h(θ)hH(θ) dθ and
∫
Sem
h(θ)hH(θ) dθ by RSdk , RSdi
and RSem , respectively. 
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF RS
Proof: The integral matrix RS in (25) is an N ×N matrix.
Here we assume that set S is a union of I separate subintervals
as follows
S =
I⋃
i=1
Si, (42)
where
Si = [θ
i
min, θ
i
max]. (43)
9MLI-SLNR(vdk) =
∫
Sdk
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dk
h(θ)hH(θ)vdk dθ∫
Sdk
σ2dk dθ +
K∑
i=1,i6=k
∫
Sdi
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dk
h(θ)hH(θ)vdk dθ +
M∑
m=1
∫
Sem
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dk
h(θ)hH(θ)vdk dθ
a
=
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dk
∫
Sdk
h(θ)hH(θ) dθvdk∫
Sdk
σ2dk dθ + α
2
1β
2
1Psv
H
dk
K∑
i=1,i6=k
∫
Sdi
h(θ)hH(θ) dθvdk + α
2
1β
2
1Psv
H
dk
M∑
m=1
∫
Sem
h(θ)hH(θ) dθvdk
b
=
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dk
RSdk
vdk
σ2dkθBW + α
2
1β
2
1Psv
H
dk
K∑
i=1,i6=k
RSdi
vdk + α
2
1β
2
1Psv
H
dk
M∑
m=1
RSemvdk
=
α21β
2
1Psv
H
dk
RSdk
vdk
σ2dkθBW + α
2
1β
2
1Psv
H
dk
RSd\Sdk
vdk + α
2
1β
2
1Psv
H
dk
RSevdk
=
v
H
dk
RSdk
vdk
σ2dk
θBW
α21β
2
1Ps
+ vHdkRSd\Sdkvdk + v
H
dk
RSevdk
=
v
H
dk
RSdk
vdk
vHdk
(
σ2dk
θBW
α21β
2
1Ps
IN +RSd\Sdk +RSe
)
vdk
. (41)
Then the (p, q) entry of RSi has the following form
RSi(p, q) =
∫ θimax
θi
min
hp(θ)h
H
q (θ) dθ
=
∫ θimax
θi
min
1√
N
e
j2pi(p−(N+1)/2)d cos θ
λ
· 1√
N
e−
j2pi(q−(N+1)/2)d cos θ
λ dθ
=
1
N
∫ θimax
θi
min
e
j2pi(p−q)d cos θ
λ dθ. (44)
Let us define the center point and length of integral interval
as
θi0 =
θimin + θ
i
max
2
, (45)
and
∆θi =θ
i
max − θimin, (46)
respectively, and the new integral variable is
x =
2pi
∆θi
(θ − θi0), (47)
i.e.,
θ =
∆θi
2pi
x+ θi0. (48)
Using the above definition or transformation, Eq. (44) is
rewritten as
RSi(p, q)
=
1
N
∫ pi
−pi
e
j2pi(p−q)d cos(
∆θi
2pi
x+θi0)
λ · ∆θi
2pi
dx
=
∆θi
2piN
∫ pi
−pi
e
j2pi(p−q)d cos(
∆θi
2pi
x+θi0)
λ dx
=
∆θi
2piN
∫ pi
−pi
e
j2pi(p−q)d[cos(θi0) cos(
∆θi
2pi
x)−sin(θi0) sin(
∆θi
2pi
x)]
λ dx
=
∆θi
2piN
∫ pi
−pi
e[a
i
pq cos(cix)+b
i
pq sin(cix)] dx
=
∆θi
N
gB(a
i
pq, b
i
pq, ci), (49)
where gB(·) is the extension of the modified Bessel function
of the first kind with the integer order 0 [36], i.e.,
gB(a
i
pq, b
i
pq, ci) =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
e[a
i
pq cos(cix)+b
i
pq sin(cix)] dx, (50)
aipq ,
j2pi(p− q)d cos(θi0)
λ
, (51)
bipq , −
j2pi(p− q)d sin(θi0)
λ
, (52)
and
ci ,
∆θi
2pi
. (53)
This completes the derivation of the (p, q) entry RSi(p, q)
of matrix RSi . Note that set S is a union of I separated
subintervals as shown in (41). Then the (p, q) element of
10
matrix RS is expanded as the summation of integrations over
all subintervals
RS(p, q) =
I∑
i=1
RSi(p, q) =
I∑
i=1
∆θi
N
gB(a
i
pq, b
i
pq, ci). (54)
This completes the derivation of matrix RS . 
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